



Life cycle key management costs in secure multicast (draft-irtf-gsec-lifecycle-00.txt)

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Introduction

- Normally, the user join/ leave rekeying is the principal cost of key management, with tree initialization costs being negligible:
 - However, applications exist, where the tree initialization costs is significant, such as file transfer and videoconferences
- We introduce the concept of the life cycle key distribution cost for hierarchical tree such as LKH. It takes account of:
 - The cost of rekeying when users join or leave an established group
 - The costs of building a tree during initialization of a multicast group
- We show how the optimum outdegree (k) in a hierarchical tree varies with the expected user volatility and rekey factor.

User volatility implications on tree outdegree k

- Three cases are considered:
 - Case 1: Receivers with perfect memory
 - Case 2: A receiver gets all the keys at the time of joining
 - Case 3: Rekey the group on each join (backward secrecy)
- We define the volatility factor α as the mean number of rekeys per Group Member (GM).
- We observe that:
 - In Case 2, key life cycle cost can be reduced significantly at low volatility by optimizing k , for example corporate videoconferencing
 - Backward secrecy has the highest cost
 - For frequent rekeying ($\alpha \gg 1$) the curves in all cases converge and the cost is independent of the initialization approach

Group key updating implications on tree outdegree k

- The life cycle cost can also be considered by taking into account periodic rekeying to prevent cryptanalysis.
- We define a normalized rekey factor $\beta = T / N \cdot \tau$; where T is the lifetime of the group; τ group update and N is total number of group members.
- We observe that:
 - low β , i.e. when the number of rekeys per GM is low, the optimum value of k is $\gg 3$
 - At high β , i.e. rekeying to prevent cryptanalysis predominates over initial tree building costs, and so the optimum value of k is 2

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|          |          k = 3          | k optimized for min cost | | | | |
|Volatility|-----|
| alpha   |1.Perfect|2. Tx as|3. PBS |1.Perfect|2. Tx as|3. PBS |
|         |memory  | reqd  |(int   |memory  | reqd  |(int   |
|         |(pre-reg)|(int arr|arrival)|(pre-reg)|(int arr|arrival)|
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| 0.0001 | 1500 | 6290 | 12580 | 1020 | 1100 | 12410 |
| 0.001  | 1520 | 6310 | 12590 | 1090 | 1560 | 12420 |
| 0.01   | 1680 | 6470 | 12760 | 1400 | 2610 | 12590 |
| 0.1    | 3280 | 8070 | 14410 | 3220 | 5870 | 14290 |
| 1      | 19360| 24150| 30940 | 19340| 23810| 30940 |
| 10     | 180130| 184920| 196210| 179350| 184560| 195590 |
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**Table 1: life cycle cost as a function of volatility alpha
(N = 1000 receivers)**

Volatility alpha	1. Perf mem (pre-register)	2. Tx as reqd (Intermittent arrivals)	3. PBS (Intermittent arrivals)
0.01	9	38	4
0.1	4	9	4
1	3	4	3
10	3	3	3

Table 2: optimum value of tree outdegree k as a function of volatility alpha (N = 1000 receivers)

Outdegree k	1. Perf mem (pre-register)	2. Tx as reqd (Intermittent arrivals)	3. PBS (Intermittent arrivals)
2	3890	11860	16890
3	3280	8070	14410
4	3230	6880	14400
6	3410	6070	15760
10	4010	5900	19450
20	5560	6820	28770

**Table 3: cost sensitivity illustrated for volatility $\alpha = 0.1$
(N = 1000 receivers)**

Conclusions

- We have shown how pre-registration (case 1) can reduce the hierarchical tree initialization cost.
- For applications with low volatility α , there is an optimum tree outdegree that varies with the volatility α .
- Similarly, the optimum tree outdegree varies with the rekey factor β that reflects the number of group key updates.
- Possible future direction: Focusing on the key lifecycle cost for GSAKMP and GDOI.
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