

An additional mode of key distribution in MIKEY

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Public key in MIKEY (RFC 3830)

- MIKEY Public key mode requires initiator to have responder's Public key (PKr) before sending the I_MESSAGE

Initiator

Responder

I_MESSAGE =

HDR, T, RAND, [IDi|CERTi], [IDr], {SP},

KEMAC, [CHASH], **PKE** SIGNi ---->

R_MESSAGE =

[<----] HDR, T, [IDr], V

PKE = E(PKr, env_key)

KEMAC = E(encr_key, IDi || {TGK}) || MAC

Problem description

- Very often, one does not have the PKr in advance, especially for peer-to-peer communication such as SIP
 - Certificate of responder may not be known in advance
 - Can not use MIKEY Public Key mode
- Responder may have different identity than one originally called
 - Calls may be made to “group aliases”, phone numbers for hunt groups, etc.
 - “Forking” or “retargeting” (SIP for “forwarding”)
 - Can not predict who will answer
 - Will result in multiple round-trips
- You may still want to do media encryption (sRTP) in those cases

Proposed solution

- New MIKEY Mode
- Responder generates TGKs and PKE

Initiator

Responder

I_MESSAGE = HDR, T, CERT_i, [ID_r], [SP], SIGN_i -->

R_MESSAGE = HDR, T, RAND, ID_r|CERT_r, {SP}, KEMAC, PKE, SIGN_r

PKE = E(PK_i, env_key)

KEMAC = E(encr_key, ID_r || {TGK}) || MAC

I_MESSAGE

- Presents public key/cert of initiator to responder
- Includes Timestamp (T) for replay protection
- Responder's Identity (IDr) optional
 - Indicating who initiator is interested in talking to
- I_MESSAGE signed (SIGNi) to protect against DOS
 - Entire MIKEY message


R_MESSAGE

- Full roundtrip to download TGKs
- PKE encrypted with Initiator public KEY (PKi)
- KEMAC includes encrypted Identity of responder (IDr) & TGKs, plus a Message Authentication Code (MAC)
- Also includes responder CERTr or IDr if there is reason to believe that CERTr is already provided using other means

Other

- Initiator may decide to proceed or not by based on identity/certificate of responder
- New mode especially useful when expecting retargeting, forking, etc.
 - When you still want media encryption (sRTP)
- Traditional mode useful when NOT willing to accept retargeting (i.e., when only wishing to reach a specific known user)

Use of MIKEY-R with multicast



Conclusion

- Open issues
 - Describe multicast conferencing
 - Describe 3-way calling with identical media streams
- Proposal:
 - Accept new MIKEY mode as working group document