

Key Management for Multimedia Sessions (and SRTP)

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**Design Criteria for Multimedia Session
Key Management in Heterogeneous Networks**

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Key Management for Multimedia Sessions

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Outline

- Background and Problem
- Requirements
- Proposed solution
- Questions

Scenarios and Environment

- Multimedia sessions
- Peer-to-peer communication
- Multicast
- Small groups

- Heterogeneous environment

The origin of the key management work

The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)

- Work item in the AVT WG
- Encryption of the RTP payload
- Optional authentication of the RTP packet

Some of the properties:

- a low computational cost
- limited packet expansion
- the preservation of RTP header compression efficiency

Problem

- Need a key management protocol for SRTP and other possible multimedia security protocols
- Must be able to work in the stated scenarios and environments

- Any existing solutions?
 - Kerberos, IKE, GDOI, TLS etc.

General Requirements

- It **MUST** give e2e security
- It **MUST** support multi-party and multicast sessions
- It **SHOULD** be possible for a single party to generate a key and transmit it securely to another party (i.e. a key transport mechanism **SHOULD** be supported)

General Requirements (cont.)

- It **SHOULD** be adaptable to also support future multimedia security protocols
- Both unidirectional and mutual authentication **SHOULD** be possible
- **SAs SHOULD NOT** be associated/indexed with IP addresses

Admin Domain Requirements

- It **MUST** be possible to manage the users in different administrative domains.
- It **MUST** allow users from different administrative domains to communicate securely.
- It **MUST** at least be scalable to a size close to current Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)

Key Maintenance Requirements

It **MUST** specify mechanisms for:

- re-keying (new master key),
 - session key derivation (from the master key), and
 - key refresh (new session key)
-
- convenient keying and re-keying mechanisms suitable for small groups **MUST** be provided

DoS Protection Requirements

- It **SHOULD NOT** create any state at the responder side until a positive authentication has been performed
- It **SHOULD NOT** devote substantial computation resources to peers whose claimed source has not been verified to be operational

Efficiency Requirements

- Only the minimal set of necessary functions **SHOULD** be mandatory to implement
- It **MUST** support a selection of efficient security protocols, algorithms, and parameters

Efficiency Requirements (cont.)

Strive to reduce:

- the number of round trips (MUST)
- the size of the messages (SHOULD)
- the number of expensive cryptographic operations (SHOULD)

To Conclude

1. End-to-end protection requirement
2. Key transport mechanism requirement
3. Small groups/multicast
4. Efficiency requirements

	1	2	3	4
Kerberos	No			
IKE		No	No	No
GDOI		?		No
TLS		No	No	

Basic ideas

- Using key transport mechanisms
- Integrate (if possible) with session control protocols

Key transport mechanisms

- Shared secret based
- Public key based

Key negotiation mechanism

- Diffie-Hellman based exchange

Public-key Based Mechanism

Initiator, A

Responder, B

$$U = E(P_B, k_M \parallel T \parallel ID_A)$$

$$F = \text{Sign}(S_A, H(U))$$

$$C = [E(P_B, \text{Cert}_A)]$$

$$V = H(\text{Cert}_B)$$

U, [F], [C], [V]



Verification and decryption

[R]



$$R = H(ID_A \parallel ID_B \parallel k_M)$$

Public/Private key:	P_X/S_X
Master key:	k_M
Timestamp:	T
Certificate:	Cert_X

Shared Secret Based Mechanism

- Similar to the public-key based
- Exchange
 - public-key encryption with symmetric
 - signature with MAC

Diffie-Hellman Based Exchange

Initiator, A

Responder, B

x random

$F = \text{Sign}(S_A, g^x \parallel T)$

$C = [E(P_B, \text{Cert}_A)]$

$g^x, T, F, [C], [ID_A]$

Verification (and decryption)

y random

$F = \text{Sign}(S_B, g^y \parallel T)$

$C = [E(P_A, \text{Cert}_B)]$

$g^y, F, [C]$

Public/Private key:

P_X/S_X

Certificate:

Cert_X

DH group generator:

g

Timestamp:

T

Master key:

$k_M = g^{xy}$

Other Issues

Negotiation of cryptographic parameters

Initiator: sends one proposal

Responder: Possible error message with the supported parameters

- Session Key derivation and key refresh
 - AES in Output Feed-Back Mode
- Re-keying
 - Executing the protocol again (without previously exchanged static information)

Integration with Session Control Protocols

Two proposed protocols:

- SIP (Session Initiation Protocol)
- RTSP (Real Time Streaming Protocol)

- Use the attribute field (a=) in SDP
(Session Description Protocol)

Time for Comments and Questions